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Abstract
I estimate the costs for establishments of hires and separations using a dynamic la-
bor demand framework and matched employer-employee data from Germany, which
records the exact dates of start and end of an employment spell. I estimate ad-
justment costs under different assumptions of adjustment frequencies. Under the
assumption that establishments revise their labor demand every month, GMM esti-
mates suggest hiring costs per employee of approximately 5,000 Euros, and costs of
separations of 1,000 Euros. Hiring costs vary considerably between skilled (8,000 to
28,000 Euros per hire) and unskilled (4,000 to 8,000 Euros) labor. Spatial aggrega-
tion (large establishments) is associated with lower cost estimates, and only monthly
adjustment frequencies yield estimates consistent with theoretical predictions.
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1 Introduction
Estimating the costs associated with adjusting employment is a notoriously difficult en-
deavor. In particular, three difficulties in estimating adjustment costs have been ubiqui-
tous. Can we infer anything about the structure of adjustment costs from data above the
plant or firm unit, say from sectoral data? The answer, it turns out, is no, a point made
most forcefully in Hamermesh (1989), where employment fluctuations aggregated over
just 7 plants suggest frequent and incremental adjustment, while the individual plants
exhibit intermittent adjustment. Only the former would be compatible with a purely
convex cost structure of adjustment. The wide availability of micro-data now easily
solves this problem. The second difficulty – temporal aggregation – is more difficult to
tackle (see Hamermesh (1993)). We can reasonably assume that the appropriate unit to
look at is the individual firm or plant, but at what frequency it revises its labor demand
is unclear. One may look at the time period that elapses between two adjustments, but
the employer or manager might have decided any number of times not to adjust within
that period. Most data used in the literature dictate what time frame is used by the
frequency of its waves, mostly quarterly or annual. This paper is distinct in the labor
adjustment literature in using matched employer-employee data which identify the exact
point of time of every employment flow into and out of an establishment, thus allowing
the use of any adjustment frequency, from daily to annual. Out of four different time
specifications (monthly, quarterly, half-annual, annual), I find that only the monthly
results are compatible with a dynamic labor demand model allowing for asymmetric
adjustment costs similar to the ones used in the literature. Finally, the third difficulty
has been getting actual point estimates of the money-value of costs. Many studies have
focused on inference of the structure of costs, but were not able to identify cost values
due to identification issues (e.g. only parameters normalized by residual variances were
identified), a recent example being Nilsen et al. (2006).
Despite these difficulties finding ways to estimate and infer adjustment costs is a
worthwhile and important task and a starting point for answering a myriad of interesting
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questions: Why did unemployment surge in the US but not in Germany during the 2009
recession, despite comparable contractions in GDP? Do we expect the labor market to
adjust through wages or employment, and how is unemployment affected when adjusting
employment is costly? Are technological parameters of production functions estimated
consistently when adjustment costs are not accounted for? In any case, when modeling
adjustment costs one needs to start with some idea of how they are incurred (are they
fixed or variable, symmetric or asymmetric?), of their magnitude, and of the frequency
of adjustment by employers. All of those issues have been reflected on earlier, and
Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) provide a review of the earlier literature.
Typically the identification of fixed and/or non-convex adjustment costs has been
achieved by exploiting the periods of inactivity and using some kind of latent variable
model to maximize a likelihood function on the probabilities of expansion and contraction
(Hamermesh (1989), Hamermesh (1992), Nilsen et al. (2006), and Vareja˜o and Portu-
gal (2007) using a hazard function estimation). The difficulty of this approach is how
exactly the thresholds between the different regimes should be specified. Abowd and
Kramarz (2003) provide the most direct method of estimating adjustment costs, using
reported costs and employment changes using a cross-section of French establishments.
Reported costs are regressed on a quadratic of hires and separations, where the constant
is interpreted as fixed costs, and the coefficient on the quadratic as a measure of the
convexity of costs. This has the advantage of circumventing temporal aggregation issues,
but can capture only measured/recorded and reported costs. They find substantial costs
of terminations, the fixed component often estimated at more than 150,000 Euros (1992
values). Hall (2004) uses annual sectoral data and identifies convex adjustment costs by
the response of factor input ratios to factor price ratios. In the presence of adjustment
costs, input ratios should be less responsive to changes in price ratios. Estimation results
cast some doubt on this method, since the coefficients carry “wrong” signs for 10 out
of 18 sectors (being estimated imprecisely, Hall interprets those as no costs for the said
industries). Finally, Caballero et al. (1997) and Cooper et al. (2004) exploit information
on the correlations of hours worked per employee and number of employees to estimate
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adjustment costs, the former relying on a theoretical and possibly wrongly measured con-
struct (the “gap” between desired and actual employment), and the latter using iterative
methods with the full dynamic problem of the establishments being solved numerically
at every step of the iteration. While the latter approach maps closely from theory to
estimation, it is computationally intensive and difficult to extend to more complicated
cases, such as the inclusion of different types of labor.
This paper uses generalized method of moments estimation of the first-order-condition
of the dynamic labor demand problem of an establishment. While GMM has become a
standard application to dynamic panel models, to my knowledge it has not been applied
in the adjustment cost framework. It has the advantage of being easily extended to
heterogeneous labor applications by simply estimating as many first-order-conditions as
there are factor inputs. All of the three difficulties mentioned above are – to some extent
– dealt with. I obtain and compare results under different assumptions of adjustment
frequencies, and coefficients for a model with constant marginal adjustment costs can be
interpreted as Euro-costs per employee.
2 Framework
The establishment maximizes its expected present value of current and future profits by
choosing how much labor to employ today, taking as given all prices. That decision will
matter for its labor demand in the next period, because the cost of changing employment
tomorrow will depend on employment today. This is intuitive and easy to see in a
recursive formulation:
V (lt−1, It) = max
lt
ptq(lt)−wt · lt − c(lt−1, lt) + βEV (lt, It+1) (1)
Here c is the cost of adjusting labor, w is a wage vector for different kinds of labor.
Labor types will be indexed by j, and I assume that adjustment costs are separable for
types of labor: c =
∑
j cj(lt−1,j , lt,j) The expectation here is formed over any kind of
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information (I) that will be revealed at the beginning of next period, including wages,
prices, productivity, and demand. The establishment enters the period with its employ-
ment from the previous period, it observes this period’s wages, prices, etc. and decides
how many new employees to employ. Importantly, adjustments are NET adjustments.
There are two reasons for this: The first is theoretical. In the framework above it makes
no sense for the establishment to hire and separate from one labor type in the same
period, since every worker of a certain type is assumed to be equal. Second, comparing
small and big establishments will provide some information on how aggregation within an
establishment affects estimates of adjustment costs. Big establishments can be thought
of as consisting of subdivisions, some of which might expand, and others contract within
the same time period. Costs will be incurred, but in the aggregate no adjustments will
be recorded. For small establishments net adjustment will coincide with gross adjust-
ment most of the time. To be sure, legal and technological differences between small
and big establishments make it impossible to attribute differences in estimates solely to
aggregation effects, and results should be interpreted as suggestive. A priori I would
hypothesize that adjustment is more costly for larger establishments, because large es-
tablishments are subject to stricter legal rules concerning labor adjustment and relations.
Furthermore, they probably command and employ more resources in the hiring process.
However, if adjustment costs are linear (a discussion of German labor relations and differ-
ent cost specifications follows below), and aggregation will suggest frequent adjustment,
the marginal cost of adjustment is likely to be underestimated. Aggregation and struc-
tural/institutional factors would work in opposite directions, so that smaller estimates
for larger establishments would be conservative evidence for aggregation bias.
To keep the exposition simple, I solve equation (1) with one type of labor in the main
text. For heterogeneous labor I will make explicit any additional assumptions.
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2.1 Convex costs
To start with the simpler model, I first derive labor demand for a convex adjustment cost
function from Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) allowing for asymmetric costs for hiring and
separations:
c(lt−1, lt) =
a
2
(lt − lt−1)2 − b(lt − lt−1) + exp(b(lt − lt−1))− 1
If b > 0, the marginal cost of a positive adjustment exceeds that of a negative adjustment,
and vice versa if b < 0. Solving (1) with this is simple, since the value function is
differentiable. Using the envelope theorem I get
ptq
′
t − wt − a(lt − lt−1) + b(1− β)− beb(lt−lt−1) − βalt
+βE
(
alt+1 + be
b(lt+1−lt)
)
= 0
Assume that E(lt+1|lt) = lt. Given all information today, let the establishment treat next
period’s optimal labor demand as a random variable distributed normally with mean lt.
Figure 1 plots a histogram of lt+1 − lt. The distribution is symmetric around zero,
lending some justification for this assumption. Then eblt+1 is distributed log-normally
with E(eblt+1) = eblt+(b
2σ2)/2. We can thus rewrite the above equation as
ptq
′
t − wt − a(lt − lt−1) + b(1− β)− beb(lt−lt−1) + βbe(b
2σ2)/2 = 0 (2)
2.2 Linear, asymmetric costs
This case is a little more complicated because of the non-differentiability of the value
function at lt = lt−1. Write the problem now as:
V (lt−1, It) = max
lt
ptq(lt)−wtlt−τ+1lt>lt−1(lt−lt−1)−τ−1lt−1>lt(lt−1−lt)+βEV (lt, It+1)
(3)
The cost of hiring a worker is τ+, the cost of a separation is τ−. The indicator functions
take on the value one, if the expression in the subscript becomes true. For example,
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Figure 1: Distribution of Lt+1 − Lt, cut at adjustments ≥ 10
the direct cost of hiring three more workers is 3τ+. The way to solve this is by solving
two constrained optimization problems. If we let the establishment solve its problem
restricting it to hiring or not changing its employment, this is equivalent to solving
max
lt
ptq(lt)− wtlt − τ+(lt − lt−1) + βEV (lt, It+1) s.t.
lt ≥ lt−1
The solution is
ptq
′(lt)− wt − τ+ + βE∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lt
= 0 if lt > lt−1 (4)
ptq
′(lt)− wt − τ+ + λ+t + βE
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lt
= 0 if lt−1 ≥ lt (5)
Here, λ+ is the Lagrange multiplier for this problem. Similarly, the solution when con-
strained not to hire, is
ptq
′(lt)− wt + τ− + βE∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lt
= 0 if lt−1 > lt (6)
ptq
′(lt)− wt + τ− − λ−t + βE
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lt
= 0 if lt ≥ lt−1 (7)
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The establishment must have satisfied equation (4) if it hired, equation (6) if it con-
tracted, and equations (5) and (7) if it didn’t change its employment. It remains to find
an expression for ∂V (lt,It+1)∂lt . Assuming the value function is differentiable in its state,
denote the solution to equation (4) by l∗t,h (for hiring) and its associated value by V
∗
h , to
equation (6) by l∗t,s (for separation) and V ∗s . If inactivity is optimal, denote this by l∗t−1
and V ∗in. Then
V (lt−1, It) = max{V ∗h , V ∗in, V ∗s }
where
V ∗h = ptq(l
∗
t,h)− wtl∗t,h − τ+
(
l∗t,h − lt−1
)
+ βEV
(
l∗t,h, It+1
)
V ∗in = ptq(l
∗
t−1)− wtl∗t−1 + βEV
(
l∗t−1, It+1
)
V ∗s = ptq(l
∗
t,s)− wtl∗t,s + τ−
(
l∗t,s − lt−1
)
+ βEV
(
l∗t,s, It+1
)
Equation (3) becomes the first line if hiring is optimal, the second line if inactivity is
optimal, and finally the third line if separation is optimal. Taking derivatives for each
line with respect to the state variable lt−1 we get:
∂V ∗h
∂lt−1
=
(
ptq
′(l∗t,h)− wt − τ+ + βE
∂V (l∗t,h, It+1)
∂l∗t,h
)
∂l∗t,h
∂lt−1
+ τ+
∂V ∗in
∂lt−1
= ptq
′(l∗t−1)− wt + βE
∂V (l∗t−1, It+1)
∂l∗t,h
∂V ∗s
∂lt−1
=
(
ptq
′(l∗t,s)− wt + τ− + βE
∂V (l∗t,s, It+1)
∂l∗t,s
)
∂l∗t,s
∂lt−1
− τ−
The terms in parentheses in the first and third lines will be zero - the familiar principle
of optimality. Note that the second line equals τ+−λ+t−1 and λ−t−1−τ− from equations (5)
and (7). Call this expression ζt−1. Denote the establishment’s probability of hiring next
period by pi+t , and its probability of separation by pi
−
t . We then have
E
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lt
= pi+t τ
+ − pi−t τ− + (1− pi+t − pi−t )ζt
Finally, writing the first order conditions from equations (4) to (7) in one equation and
substituting the expression for the expected value, we can write:
ptq
′(lt)−wt+τ−(1lt−1>lt−βpi−t )−τ+(1lt>lt−1−βpi+t )+ζt(1lt−1=lt−β(1−pi−t −pi+t )) = 0 (8)
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Thus, if the cost parameters τ can be treated as coefficients, this specification predicts
a positive coefficient on 1lt−1>lt −βpi−t and a negative coefficient on 1lt>lt−1 −βpi+t , while
the coefficients have the nice interpretation of being marginal costs of separations and
hires relative to inactivity, respectively. The intuition is straightforward: A hire costs
τ+, but reduces the chance of incurring hiring costs next period. Separations enter with
a positive sign because the marginal effect on sales is negative. The term multiplying ζt
is collinear with the terms multiplying the τ and is dropped in the subsequent analysis.
Hires and separations are observed, but once again the establishment’s expectations (the
pi) are not. I will have to infer these probabilities. Append an error term to (8) to account
for any deviations from the establishment’s “true” expectations from the author’s best
guess and for any other measurement and simplification errors.
2.3 Fixed costs
The model does not include fixed costs of labor adjustment. The reason for this omission
is weak - if any - identification of fixed costs from linear costs as specified in the previous
section. Convex and linear variable costs lead to distinct predictions. The first should
lead to frequent and small adjustments, the second to long periods of inactivity and
consequently to a large fraction of inactivity for any cross section. However, inactivity will
also be a property of fixed costs. There remains some hope for identification from the size
of adjustment conditional on any adjustment happening. However, this is complicated by
two factors: First, one needs assumptions on what labor demand would be in the absence
of any adjustment costs, since linear variable costs are likely to dampen both upward and
downward adjustments, while the marginal cost of hiring or separating the second worker
is zero in the case of purely fixed costs. Presumably, adjustments in this latter scenario
would be bigger. Second, the data for this paper include many establishments with fewer
than ten employees, and employment change is not continuous, not even approximately
so for small establishments, amplifying the aforementioned problem. Thus, one needs to
be cautious in interpreting results. If costs are a mix of fixed and linear variable costs,
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and the specification attributes all to variable costs, then the cost coefficients will be
approximate measures of average, but not of marginal adjustment costs.
2.4 Establishments’ adjustment frequencies
A major advantage of the matched employer-employee data used in this paper is that
every start and every termination of an employment spell can be exactly dated for all
employees of the establishments in this panel. Most of the literature has been restricted
to temporal aggregation at the frequency at which the panel was available. Employment
adjustment has been identified off the changes in stocks of employment between two
points of time given by the panel frequency - the net adjustment. While this seems
reasonable for a sufficiently short time interval, it is a clear limitation for low-frequency,
e.g. annual panels. An establishment hiring x employees in March and dismissing them
in September will not have a recorded adjustment from January to December, yet both
decisions must have been responses to something and presumably have been costly. The
data at hand allow distinguishing between net and gross flows, and with a different
framework an identification strategy using gross changes might be possible. Here, I
chose to follow the literature in keeping the general dynamic programming framework,
but to estimate the model for different time periods separating t from t + 1. This has
three advantages in regard to checking robustness and sensitivity of results: First, for
shorter time periods net adjustment will be closer to gross adjustment, and running
estimations for different time periods will give us an idea of how sensitive results are to
timing assumptions. Second, I can compare results from the full sample to a sample for
which gross and net adjustments are the same, providing yet another test of aggregation
bias. Third, the above formulation can in principle be extended to the case where an
establishment incurs costs from current adjustment, but also still from adjustment in the
previous period.
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2.5 Production function
I use the translog production function for all estimates:
ln q = α0 +
∑
j
Bj ln lj + (1/2)Bjj(ln lj)2 +∑
k 6=j
Bjk ln lj ln lk

Taking the derivative of q with respect to lj and multiplying this by the price I arrive at
pq′j = R×
Bj
lj
+
Bjj ln lj
lj
+
∑
k 6=j
Bjk
ln lk
lj
 (9)
where R denotes the sales of the establishment. This production function has the obvi-
ous and well-known property of being very flexible (see Berndt and Christensen (1973)
for a discussion). On the other hand, the estimates will not be informative for any
technological inferences. When more than one type of labor is considered (j > 1), equa-
tion (9) might not be defined for some establishments (due to logs of and divisions by
zero) and for estimation purposes dummies for this case will be included in the regression
equations, introducing ‘kinks’ into the production function without any concrete inter-
pretation. Furthermore, the quadratic and interaction terms will very likely introduce
ranges of production with some and other ranges with different properties, e.g. increas-
ing returns to scale for some labor-type combinations, and decreasing returns for others.
Yet, the use of a flexible production function is better suited for the problem at hand.
The production technology is not interesting in itself for the purpose of this paper, and
it is more important to avoid biasing adjustment costs results by imposing technological
restrictions.
A more serious problem could be the omission of any other factor of production, no-
tably capital. Suppose capital is costly to adjust and it is complementary in production
to labor. If labor is adjusted together with capital, some or much of capital adjustment
costs might be attributed to costs of adjusting labor (see for example Asphjell et al.
(2010) for a study of interrelated factor demand). Table 1 reports statistics relating in-
vestment to net labor adjustment. Investments are reported for a year, so the statistics
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Table 1: Investment and Labor Adjustment
fraction hires fraction separations
small
I>0 3.2 3.6
I=0 3.3 4.3
large
I>0 20.7 22.7
I=0 15.9 21.4
fraction: Fraction of establishments in %, correlation: Correlation between size of adjustment and size
of investment
relate to annual adjustments. Large establishments are more likely to adjust employment
when they invest. This is particularly true for hires. 20.7% of large establishments have
hired in a year in which they have reported investment, compared to 15.9% of hiring by
establishments which did not invest. However, investing firms have also been slightly
more likely to contract than those firms which did not invest. For small establishments,
hiring does not seem to be effected much by investment, while separations occur more
frequently at establishments with zero investment. These statistics suggest that invest-
ment might have been labor-complementing. Furthermore, small establishments seem to
have exploited complementarities by fewer separations, while large establishments have
adjusted through hiring. While labor-capital complementarities are present, they seem
to be more important for bigger establishments.
3 Institutional characteristics
A full characterization of the German labor market and labor relations are out of the
scope of this paper, but a general knowledge of institutions governing or influencing ad-
justment costs is helpful. Apart from a relatively high coverage of employees by collective
agreements (in 2009 56% of all employees in West and 38% in East Germany were covered
by sectoral collective agreements, see IAB (2010)), three aspects about labor markets in
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Germany are important for adjustment costs:
1. Establishments in Germany engage in training youth entering the labor market.
This happens in the framework of the dual system: Besides working and learning
at an establishment, apprentices attend school for one or two days of the week.
Costs are covered by employers, but net costs of training are notoriously difficult
to calculate. Harhoff and Kane (1997) list studies putting the annual costs of
training one apprentice at a range of 5,000$ to 10,000$ in 1990 dollars (see the
same study for a more detailed overview of this training system).
2. At establishments with at least five permanent employees, workers’ councils can
be set up at the initiative of the employees. These councils need to be informed
and consulted for certain decisions, including restructuring of employment and
recruitment, and enjoy certain co-determination rights for procedures related to
dismissals. See Addison et al. (2001) for a lengthier discussion.
3. Employees at establishments with at least five (since 2004 at least ten) permanent
employees are protected by certain provisions of the Kundigungsschutzgesetz - dis-
missal protection bill: Roughly, employees can be dismissed only as a consequence
of misconduct or special business situations (drop in sales, organisational changes).
See BMAS (2010).
In general, adjustment is more regulated – and appears to be more costly – for large es-
tablishments, tenured personnel, and high-wage personnel, since compensation/severance
payments are based on these measures.
4 Data
The data are the matched employer-employee panel (LIAB), of the German IAB (In-
stitute for employment research). Several versions of the LIAB exist, distinguished by
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cross-sectional and longitudinal coverage. This paper uses longitudinal version 3, with
14 years of observations for some 4,200 establishments. The data are described at length
in Jacobebbinghaus (2008). Here are the basics: The data consist of two sources, the
establishment panel (short: panel), and the employment history (short: history). Once
a year a survey for the establishment panel is conducted, and establishments are asked
to report sales, employment, investments et cetera. This panel is then matched with
administrative data of the German federal employment agency (history). Every new
employee and separation has to be reported by the employer to this agency. Wages are
also reported. The wage data here are known to be more reliable than survey data, since
they are based on the actual payments reported to the agency. Misreporting is unlawful.
Occupations not subject to social security contributions (certain state employees, doc-
tors with private practices, firm-owners et cetera) are not covered by the data, but some
80% of the German employment is. Thus, I know for any given day how many people
are employed in any establishment covered by the LIAB, how much they earned, their
education, and age. The education variable is reported by employers, and reporting it is
not mandatory. As a consequence, it has more missing values and for some observations
exhibits inconsistencies over time. Throughout this paper, I am using the unbalanced
panel.
4.1 Sales
Sales are from the panel and reported as the total amount of sales in the last year.
Establishments which reported budgets instead of sales are excluded, because they are
probably non-profits. Since I am mostly using a shorter time-frame than years (the
reporting frequency of the panel), yearly sales volumes have to be divided to shorter time
periods (months in this example). One way to do it would be to divide equally across all
twelve months, but there would be unrealistic jumps from December to January. Another
possibility would be to check quarterly aggregate sales for different industries and adjust
the establishments’ sales accordingly. I chose to do the following: I minimize the sum of
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Figure 2: Annual sales divided to months, even and smooth
squared sales distances from month to month over the choice of monthly sales, restricting
the sum of sales for a year to equal the sales reported by the establishment:
min
{st}Tt=1
J =
T∑
t=2
(st − st−1)2 s.t.
12∑
t=1
= S1
24∑
t=13
= S2
...
with S1 the reported sales in the first year, S2 in the second year, and so forth. This is
equivalent to smoothing the jumps between monthly sales. Figure 2 depicts an estab-
lishment with 10 years of data.
The blue, solid line shows the sales data divided evenly across the months of a year,
the dashed red line presents the sales data after the described procedure. I estimated
adjustment costs for both of the constructed monthly sales data series with quantitatively
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very similar results, lending some support to the robustness of the results to the choice
of how to divide the reported annual sales to months. The results presented in this paper
are for the smoothed sales series.
4.2 Employment
I estimate adjustment costs for different labor aggregates and for different time perspec-
tives (month, quarter, semester, year). I have aggregate labor, and labor divided into
four categories - old and young, skilled and unskilled. Old workers are workers over 40,
skilled workers are workers with higher education or college-qualifying degrees (at least
12 years of primary and secondary education) together with professional training. Only
full-time workers are considered, and workers with very low (less than 5 Euros daily
wage in January 1993 and inflated by an annual 2.5% thereafter) or high wages (more
than 400 Euros daily wage in January 1993 and inflated by an annual 2.5% thereafter)
are excluded. A problem arises if some type of worker is not employed. First, I do not
observe wages for that type (see next section). Also, the production function becomes
undefined, because of logs of zero and division by zero. Thus, for non-employment, in
the estimation I include dummies for non-employment, and the undefined parts of the
first order conditions are set to zero. Obviously, this problem does not occur if I have
only one type of labor, because the establishments always employ at least one worker.
A hire is recorded if an employee starts working at the establishment and was not
working there the previous day. A separation is recorded if an employee works at an
establishment one day, but not the next. Note that with this definition recalls and
temporary quits will count as adjustment, but immediate contract renewals will not.
4.3 Wages
If an establishment employs at least one worker of a certain type j, I take the median wage
paid for that type of labor in that establishment as wj,t. I take the median rather than the
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mean, because of some censoring issues with the wage data, but for the whole sample the
mean and median wages are very close for the different types of labor. More serious is the
problem of establishments which have not employed a certain type of labor. Note that this
is not just a non-response or random missing value problem. Since there are many small
establishments in the data, and since net and gross adjustments for small establishments
will overlap much more than for bigger establishments, dropping establishments with
unobserved wages would be undesirable. Furthermore, those establishments have chosen
not to employ, even though they could have done it for some (presumably) observed
wage. It remains to “guess” what that wage was. I take that wage to be the median
wage of that type of labor in the observed state, industry, year, and size category. Here is
an example: A small establishment in the consumer goods manufacturing sector located
in the state of Bavaria has not employed any unskilled, old worker in may 2000. What
was the wage it observed for unskilled, old workers? The median wage of unskilled, old
workers in Bavaria in the consumer goods industry in small establishments in 2000.
4.4 Expectations
Recall the final estimable optimality conditions in the linear cost case in equation (8),
all variables are observed or imputed, except the establishments’ expectations for hiring,
separating, or inactivity for the next period (pi+, pi−), and the β. I set β to a number to
make the yearly discounting factor equal to 0.95. For the expectations I pursue the fol-
lowing strategy: I predict the probabilities using an ordered probit model where I regress
adjustment today (the categories being hiring, inactivity, separation) on adjustment last
period, size of adjustment last period, wages last period, sales last period, and a full set
of state and sectoral dummies. The predictions are made separately for small (ten or less
employees) and large establishments. As a robustness check, I create cells of establish-
ments of equal period, size, sector, state, and adjustment, with potentially T*2*14*16*3
cells, where T is the number of time periods. The fraction of establishments in a cell
hiring the next period is pi+ for establishments in that cell (the fraction is calculated
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excluding the establishment to which pi+ is being assigned). Put differently, given ob-
servable characteristics of an establishment and its adjustment today, I guess that next
period it will behave like similar establishments which have made the same adjustment
in this period. The latter approach has the advantage of avoiding any distributional
assumptions, but creates a good number of empty or single-element cells. Moreover, the
establishments in the single-element cells are likely to be a non-random sub-sample of all
establishments. The results with this approach did not differ qualitatively, but estimates
were comparable for hiring and distinctly higher for separation costs (by a magnitude of
four).
5 Estimation
Estimation is by GMM and follows the procedure outlined in Arellano and Bond (1991)
– a workhorse in estimating dynamic panel models – with little differences due to nonlin-
earities in this application. Denote establishments by i and rewrite the first-differences
of equations (2) and (8)
∆(pi,tq
′
i,t)−∆wi,t − a∆(li,t − li,t−1)− b∆(eb(li,t−li,t−1)) + ∆(εi,t) = 0 (2.2’)
∆(pi,tq
′
i,t)−∆wi,t+τ−∆(1li,t−1>li,t−βpi−i,t)−τ+∆(1li,t>li,t−1−βpi+i,t)+∆(εi,t) = 0 (2.8’)
Let εi,t = µi+δt+ui,t The first difference takes out any establishment-fixed effects. With
a vector of instruments Z such that E(∆u|Z) = 0 the equations above can be estimated
by GMM. The typical assumption to qualify endogenous variables lagged two periods
and more as instruments is no serial correlation in the ui,t. Endogenous variables in
t − 2 will be uncorrelated with ui,t and ui,t−1 and valid instruments for ∆(li,t − li,t−1),
∆(1li,t>li,t−1 − βpi+i,t) et cetera, and possibly weak instruments for ∆(pi,tq′i,t), since the
second lags do not enter into this last expression. Summarizing, since wages and period
dummies are assumed exogenous, the instrument vector Z for equation (2.2’) consists
of: Differenced wages and period dummies, second and third lags of the components
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of pi,tq
′
i,t (levels), of lt, and of e
−lt . For (2.8’) Z consists of: Differenced wages and
period dummies, second and third lags of the components of pi,tq
′
i,t (levels), second and
third lags of (1li,t−1>li,t − βpi−i,t) and (1li,t>li,t−1 − βpi+i,t). Where I used different lags for
robustness checks, this is made explicit. Equations (2.2’) and (2.8’) are then estimated
by 2-step GMM using Z as instruments.
6 Results
The benchmark results are for the asymmetric, linear cost model with monthly adjust-
ments. I also discuss results for the convex model and for different frequencies of adjust-
ment. The convex model implies sensible adjustment costs for only a small adjustment
range, and longer than monthly frequencies contradict theoretical predictions.
Table 2 reports results for the model with one type of labor and monthly adjustments.
The first panel lists results using all time periods, but dummies for quarters (due to
computer memory constraints). The second uses quarter dummies for the middle third
of the panel (from September 1997 to April 2002). The third panel covers the same
period but uses monthly dummies. Finally, the fourth panel uses monthly dummies but
only observations from the year 2000, corresponding to the middle of the time covered
by the panel. The reason for comparing these four sets of data is the unusual long
dimension of the panel (166 months) and the uncertainties associated with estimates
and test procedures for long panels. Specification 1 is on the full sample, specification
2 excludes establishments for which gross adjustment is different from net adjustment
(hiring and separations taking place within the month), 3 uses only small establishments
(less than 10 employees), and 4 only big establishments.
All coefficients had the predicted signs (adjustment costs are actually positive). Hir-
ing is costly, at around 4,000 Euros per hire. Note that neither prices nor wages have
been adjusted at any point, so we might think of these as end of 1999 - beginning of 2000
Euros, as this is the middle of our sample. This holds for specifications 1 to 3, but the
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estimate drops for big establishments. I suggested above that for legal and institutional
reasons we should expect higher costs for big establishments, but that aggregation might
bias results downward. Comparing this estimate to the second specification, which ex-
cludes establishments which hire and face separations within the same month, suggests
that aggregation bias for hiring costs is substantial, at over 50%. Third, separations
seem to be very inexpensive. Significant estimates of separation costs range around
1,000 Euros, and often enough the costs are insignificant.1 This might be surprising
at first glance, but mind that every separation is counted, including retirements2 and
voluntary quits, which are both presumably costless or associated with small costs for
the employer. Survey results from the German Micro-census suggest that one fifth to
one fourth of all separations are involuntary on the part of the employee (e.g. firings,
own calculations), so that 4,000 to 5,000 Euros might be a more accurate estimate of
firing costs. Fourth, the over-identification tests in the full samples with close to half a
million observations almost always reject the exogeneity assumption for the instruments,
except for small establishments, very likely due to more homogeneity within this sub-
sample, whereas heteroscedasticity is likely to be an issue for the big establishments and
for the full sample. Going to subsequently smaller samples (panels two to four), the
Sargan test statistics become smaller without changing the cost estimates, and for the
sample covering observations from the year 2000 only, exogeneity is not rejected in any of
the specifications, except weakly for big establishments. What explains this sensitivity of
overidentification tests to the sample size? I suspect that the high number of observations
leads to more type I errors - or the reverse might be true: lower number of observations
result in the test NOT rejecting exogeneity when it should. I circumvent this technical
problem here by checking the robustness of the results to the use of different lags. Using
higher order lags allows for some autocorrelation in the residuals ui,t, but comes at the
expense of becoming less “informative” for the endogenous variables. So far, second and
1The non-parametric approach of predicting adjustment probabilities estimates separation costs of
2,400 Euros for the full sample.
2Pensions in Germany are for the most part through a mandatory governmental, pay-as-you-go system.
Thus, most employers do not pay pensions for retired personnel.
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Table 3: Homogeneous Labor - Different lags
1 2 3
All Small Big
τ+ τ− τ+ τ− τ+ τ−
Lags 3,4 3,326*** 1,551*** 5,882*** 405 1,731 413
(429) (471) (491) (391) (287) (369)
Lags 4,5,6 5,172*** -814* 6,122*** 0 2,643*** -765*
(500) (492) (489) (405) (368) (421)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P-values:***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1
third period lags of endogenous variable levels have been used as instruments.
Table 3 reports estimates for two different sets of instruments. The upper panel uses
the third and fourth lags, and the lower panel the fourth to sixth lags of the endogenous
variables. The use of lags 3 and 4 gives results in the ballpark of the previous estimation.
With lags 4, 5, and 6 estimated hiring costs increase somewhat, but the results for
separation costs become nonsensical. The instruments will become weaker the further
we go back in the lags for the instruments.
Table 4 reports results for different time periods – a comparison for which the data set
is perfectly suited. Flows and stocks of employees are calculated over quarters, semesters,
and years, possibly successively increasing the inaccuracy of measured adjustment.
We see that – except for semesters – in absolute values the coefficients increase for
longer time periods, which is not surprising given that this effectively allows adjustment
costs to be incurred over a longer time interval. Looking at small establishments, hiring
costs seem to increase proportionally to the length of the time interval (by a factor of
five for quarters and semesters, and by a factor of 10 for the year). However, the model
in months is the only one which always yields coefficients in accordance with theoretical
predictions. Note in particular the frequent negative sign for τ−. This does not neces-
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Table 4: Homogeneous Labor - Different time periods
1 2 3
All Small Big
τ+ τ− τ+ τ− τ+ τ−
Monthly 3,745*** 877*** 5,164*** 1,015*** 1,715*** 396***
(224) (202) (491) (391) (287) (110)
Quarterly 14,073*** -2,764*** 25,085*** -2,801*** 8,369*** -2,569***
(1,328) (607) (2,253) (852) (749) (432)
Half-annual 1,585** -869 23,171*** -7,167*** 3,296*** -1,904***
(777) (544) (2,574) (956) (271) (172)
Annual 52,464*** -22,252*** 47,781*** -4,961** -13,276* 6,879*
(15,232) (6,822) (12,898) (2,151) (7,426) (3,782)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P-values:***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Monthly specification
includes quarter dummies. All other specifications include corresponding time dummies.
sarily reject the use of lower than monthly frequencies. One could as well argue that the
model specification is rejected. While this might be true, it would amount to a concep-
tual rejection of the setup of many dynamic labor demand models. Yet, the results are
at odds with papers which have used quarterly and annual data but have not found cost
estimates inconsistent with theoretical predictions, such as Lapatinas (2009), Ejarque
and Portugal (2007), and Cooper et al. (2004). However, these studies impose symmetry
in the variable components and sometimes fixed component of hiring and firing costs. I
have repeated the estimations with different time periods under the constraint τ+ = τ−.
The results are reported in table 5. The results obtained under the constraint τ+ = τ−
are consistent with our expectation of positive adjustment costs, and the temporal ag-
gregation issue is still apparent. Quarterly adjustment results are somewhat close to
and higher than monthly adjustment results, but going to lower frequency adjustment
results in a dramatic drop of the estimated costs. While this seems to lend more credi-
bility to the use of quarterly data, one should keep in mind that allowing for asymmetry
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Table 5: Homogeneous Labor - Different time periods, Symmetric costs
1 2 3
All Small Big
τ τ τ
Monthly 2,345*** 3,062*** 1,178***
(117) (155) (48)
Quarterly 2,833*** 5,304*** 1,465***
(370) (512) (90)
Half-annual 100** 567 129***
(45) (384) (11)
Annual 212*** 492 348
(59) (329) (360)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P-values:***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Monthly specification
includes quarter dummies. All other specifications include corresponding time dummies.
in hiring and separation costs resulted in negative separation costs only when quarterly
adjustment was assumed.
How do the estimates compare with a model of convex costs? Note first, that the
actual behavior of inactivity of most establishments is more consistent with a linear
cost model than with a convex cost specification. Since one model does not nest the
other, formal tests of misspecification can not be performed. However, with comparable
sample sizes, and the same number of parameters and moment conditions, first step
minimized GMM objective function values were higher for the convex model for the full
sample, for small establishments, and for establishments with gross adjustment equaling
net adjustment. Not surprisingly, in this sense the convex model had a worse “fit” than
the linear model. Table 6 reports estimates of the convex model. The first column of
any of the four samples restricts the parameter b in equation (2) to be zero, imposing
symmetry of hiring and separations. The second column adds the parameter b, allowing
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Table 6: Homogeneous Labor - convex costs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Gross=Net Small Big
a 241** -0.007*** 9*** -0.002*** 382** 29 40** -2.6
(quadratic) (101) (0.001) (3) (0.0004) (165) (38) (19) (4.6)
b -0.002*** 1,730*** 1.3*** -20.9***
(exponential) (0.0001) (77) (0.1) (0)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P-values:***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Regressions include quarter
dummies.
for asymmetry. In the symmetric case, the coefficient is always significantly positive,
as it should be, and we see the familiar pattern that cost estimates are much lower
for big than for small establishments. The coefficient for establishments with gross=net
adjustment is lower in absolute value than the one for big establishments, which is rather
puzzling. The estimates for small (big) establishments imply adjustment costs of 191 (20)
Euros for an adjustment by one, 4775 (500) Euros for an adjustment by five, and 19,100
(2,000) Euros for an adjustment by ten employees. The asymmetric model fails to yield
sensible estimates for big establishments, most likely due to the difficulty of fitting a cost
curve which becomes very steep very fast to a sample with a great degree of size and
adjustment heterogeneity. The coefficients imply negative – if tiny – costs for expanding
the pool of employees. For small establishments the qualitative results from the linear
model are replicated: Hiring is more costly than separations. The estimates imply that
hiring one worker costs 16 Euros, hiring 5 workers costs 204 Euros per hire, and hiring
10 workers costs 44,000 Euros per hire. Going beyond that leads to a rapid explosion
of costs. These numerical examples illustrate a major problem with convex cost models:
The model fits reasonably well for a certain range, but becomes unrealistic for big (and
small) adjustments. Thus, a comparison of results and implied adjustment costs seem to
favor the linear adjustment cost model.
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Figure 3: Size of adjustment if any - all establishments
I turn to the case of heterogeneous labor with linear costs. Unfortunately, the deriva-
tions from section 2 do not go through without further assumptions, due to possible
complementarities in different types of labor. The first order condition for the employ-
ment of type j labor becomes:
pt
∂qt
∂lj,t
−wj,t−τ+j
(
1lj,t>lj,t−1 − βpi+j,t
)
+τ−j
(
1lj,t−1>lj,t − βpi−j,t
)
+β
∑
k 6=j
∂lk,t
∂lj,t
(
pi+k,tτ
+
k − pi−k,tτ−k
)
= 0
This condition differs from the previous equation in the inclusion of the last summation
(see appendix A for a full derivation). Note that the last term includes the change in the
optimal choice of type k labor, when the optimal choice of type j labor changes. For the
estimation I will assume the terms in the summation to be zero, while the cross-terms
in the production function are preserved. To gauge how restrictive this assumption is I
have plotted histograms for adjustment size conditional on adjustment taking place, cut
– not truncated – at an adjustment size of 11. Figure 3 shows the histogram for all
establishments. It is clear that most adjustment is of only one employee. Adjustments of
two or more employees are not uncommon, but the right tail of the histogram becomes
very thin. The pattern is more pronounced for small establishments, depicted in figure 4.
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Figure 4: Size of adjustment if any - small establishments
Building on this, table 7 reports results for heterogeneous labor. We would expect
skilled labor to be more expensive to adjust, and the estimation results confirm this.
Hiring skilled, young workers is twice as costly as hiring unskilled ones, and the difference
between old skilled and unskilled workers is even stronger. Indeed, hiring skilled and old
workers seems quite expensive, at more than 28,000 Euros. Separations, too, are more
costly for skilled workers. The high test statistics for the over-identification tests are
discomforting, but the possible roles of large sample sizes and establishment heterogeneity
have been discussed. I have run the same estimation by sectors (not reported). In only
2 of 51 cases is the exogeneity of the instruments rejected, while the general pattern of
hiring and separation costs is confirmed.
7 Conclusion
What has been learned from this exercise? The old news is: First, adjustment costs are
present, and second, convex cost models provide sensible approximations only for small
ranges of adjustment. The third result might not have been anticipated for Germany:
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Table 7: Heterogeneous labor - All establishments
1 2 3 4
Young skilled Old skilled Young unskilled Old unskilled
τ+ τ− τ+ τ− τ+ τ− τ+ τ−
All 8,479*** 2,276*** 28,551*** 3,773* 4,011*** 1,972*** 8,088*** 306*
(515) (687) (2,430) (2,037) (273) (268) (761) (303)
Sargan χ2(df = 12) 27.0*** 20.8* 96.5*** 117.9***
n 423,103
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. P-values:***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1 Regressions include a full set of
quarter dummies.
Hiring is more costly than separations – but maybe not more than firings or layoffs.
This last point can not be settled given the absence of the reason for separations in the
data. Fourth, aggregation in time and “space” matter a great deal, and this finding is
the major novelty of this paper. Under asymmetric costs, longer time intervals result
in higher estimates of hiring costs, possibly due to capturing a longer actual incidence
of costs, but reject the model predictions for separation costs frequently. If adjustment
costs are assumed to be symmetric, monthly and quarterly adjustment frequencies yield
comparable results, but in comparison annual adjustment cost estimates drop by 90% and
are economically negligible. Costs are always estimated as lower for big establishments,
for which gross changes in employment are more likely to differ from net changes. Finally,
and reassuringly, in general the model yields higher cost estimates for skilled and for older
labor.
The third result – hiring costs exceeding separation costs – may come as a surprise
and contrasts with findings for Norway by Nilsen et al. (2006). I offer some tentative
explanations: As mentioned earlier, voluntary separations on the side of the employee
may be costless or cheap for the employer. Only a fraction of all separations are involun-
tary to the employee (20%-25% according to own estimates from Micro-census data). A
more subtle explanation might be the treatment of costs as coefficients. Employers have
some, maybe a lot of discretion on how much to invest into searching new employees,
and a determinant of hiring costs might be how expensive it is to dismiss an employee
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who turns out to be a bad match. Employers might then invest in search, to minimize
involuntary separations. As a result, hiring is costly and separations are not, because
they happen voluntarily most of the time (as matches should be good as a consequence
of costly search).
The work here could be extended in several ways to deepen our understanding of
the working and consequences of adjustment costs. Hiring costs could be endogenized in
a search-framework and welfare analyzes based on the costs and benefits – in terms of
unemployment and risk-reduction – are possible extensions.
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A Demand for heterogeneous labor
Take equation (3) and extend it to K types of labor.
V (lt−1, It) = max
lt
ptq(lt)−wt · lt −
∑
k
τ+k 1lk,t>lk,t−1(lk,t − lk,t−1)
−
∑
k
τ−k 1lk,t−1>lk,t(lk,t−1 − lk,t) + βEV (lt, It+1)
Setting up a Lagrangian with constraints lk,t ≥ lk,t−1 for all k, we get the following first
order conditions:
pt
∂q
∂l1
− w1,t − τ+1 + λ+1,t + βE
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂l1,t
= 0
...
pt
∂q
∂lK
− wK,t − τ+K + λ+K,t + βE
(
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lK,t
)
= 0
This needs to be done for all hiring and separation combinations. Similarly, the ex-
pression E
(
∂V
∂lk,t
)
can be split into the sum of all different hiring-separation combinations
multiplied by the probabilities of that event happening. For example, for hiring every
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type of labor next period, the last term of the first order condition for labor type j in
this period would be
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lj,t
= pt+1
(∑
k
∂q
∂lk,t+1
∂lk,t+1
∂lj,t
)
−
∑
k
wk,t+1
∂lk,t+1
∂lj,t
−
∑
k
τ+k
(
∂lk,t+1
∂lj,t
− ∂lk,t
∂lj,t
)
Collecting all terms
∂lk,t+1
lj,t
and using envelope theorems, we and up with
∂V (lt, It+1)
∂lj,t
=
∑
k
τ+k
(
∂lk,t
∂lj,t
)
Do this for all possible hiring-separation combinations, multiply them by the correspond-
ing probabilities to get E
(
∂V
∂lj,t
)
, and plug this back into the first-order conditions, which
then can be written in one equation as in the text.
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